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Calendar
March 19-Meeting of Board of Governors of Colorado Bar Association,
Parlor A, Cosmopolitan Hotel, 9:30 a.m.
April 16-Denver Bar Association's Legal Institute on "Fair Trade Practices."

Legal Institutes and The Bar Program
By Wm. HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.
President, Colorado Bar Association

As a part of the expanded services of the Colorado Bar Association,
the Board of Governors promised you an increased number of legal institutes.
The first of the institutes to be sponsored solely by the state bar was held
at 8:00 p.m. March 2, 1949 in the Lincoln Room of the Shirley-Savoy Hotel,
Denver. It was devoted to the subject of the physician and the lawyer
in court with the Colorado Medical Society contributing speakers to present
the medical aspects of the problem. This was a most interesting and informative program. It had been planned by the Joint Committee on the Professions and the Committee on Legal Institutes, whose chairmen are Ronald
Yegge and Noah Atler.
The Denver Bar Association has already successfully sponsored three
institutes-one on labor relations problems, one on office management, and
one on real estate law. The latter program was particularly interesting
and instructive and the Junior Bar is to be highly commended for planning
and supervising this institute.
The matter of further institutes in this state is largely dependent upon
the local bar association. If a local bar association desires an institute, the
state committee will aid in planning the program and in supplying speakers.
All local associations have been circularized to ascertain their desires. Some
have responded, some have not. If you desire an institute, please correspond
with Noah Atler, Equitable Building, Denver, immediately so that the spring
and summer schedule can be completed.
Let me report to you, too, on the bar radio program-"You, and the
Law". Listening tests indicate this program to have one of the highest listener ratings of any of the non-network shows. In fact, listener interest has
exceeded some network shows. The pamphlets "You and the Law" which
boost the program have been widely distributed. In Denver, they were laid
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on every plate at each of the service club meetings. Other local associations
have likewise gotten good distribution.
Don't forget to push the pamphlet on "Wills" and on judicial reform.
Both of these are available to you for the asking. Also there is available for
your local association a series of newspaper advertisements, which were
professionally. prepared and issued by the Public Relations Committee headed
by Sydney Grossman.
These tools have been forged for your use by the state bar. Why not
make effective use of them all?

Denver Bar Nominating Committee Appointed
On March 1 President Edward G. Knowles of the Denver Bar Association announced the appointment of the following committee for the purpose of nominating officers for the annual election in May:
Horace F. Phelps, chairman
W. Clayton Carpenter
Harold Taft King
Sydney H. Grossman
Samuel S. Sherman, Jr.
President Knowles took this action in keeping with Section 3 of Article
VI of the by-laws which requires the appointment of such a committee at
least sixty days before the annual meeting. Offices for which nominations
must be made are president, first vice-president, second vice-president, two
trustees and three members of the Board of Governors. Members of the
Denver association are invited to send to the office of the secretary the names
of such persons as they may desire to propose for the consideration of the
committee.
One month before the election meeting, the committee's nominations
will be made known to the membership, which may make further additions
to the list of nominations up until fifteen days before the annual meeting
by petition signed by at least twenty members.

Lczimer County Bar Elects Officers
At the annual meeting and banquet of the Larimer County Bar Asso
ciation at Loveland on March 1, Waldo Riffenburgh was elected president,
E. G. Hartwell, vice-president, and William Allen, secretary-treasurer.
Admitted to a Higher Court
Members of the bar were saddened on February 17 by the accidental
death of Hugh McLean, Trust Officer of the Colorado National Bank. Mr.
McLean was a recognized leader in many community affairs. He had been
active in bar association activities since 1906, serving as secretary of the
Denver Bar Association from 1916 to 1923 and as president from 1923
to 1924.
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"The Missouri Plan"
By JUDGE

JAMES

M.

DOUGLAS

of the Supreme Court of Missouri

Editor's Note: The following is the substance of an address delivered by this eminent member of the Missouri Supreme Court before the February 7 meeting of the
Denver Bar Association. Members of the General Assembly attended as guests of
the bar.

I have been asked to speak to you about the plan for the selection and
tenure of judges which we now have in Missouri. Only because Missouri was
the first to adopt it, it has become popularly known as the Missouri Plan.
In reality it is the American Bar plan.
We hastily acknowledge that its original conception belongs to others.
If other states see fit to adopt it, they may do so with our blessing under any
name they choose. It may just as properly be the Colorado Plan, the Texas
Plan and the Pennsylvania Plan, to mention three of the states where, among
a number of others, it is now being advocated.
The present plan is the third method which Missouri has followed at
different times in its search for one which would provide an independent
judiciary. We all realize that only with an independent judiciary can a true
democratic form of government exist.
To make a judge really independent, his office must be as free as possible from the threat of pressure exerted for improper purposes and selfish
gain. The threat of such pressure is most generally applied through political
means-defeat at the polls.
To insure freedom from the political pressure which ordinarily attends
an elective office on a party ticket, security in office is the keystone of the
independence of a judge.
The extent of that security must be sufficient to free a judge of political
dependence, but not so absolute as might lead to or permit neglect of duty
or abuse of power.
As a result of the plan our judges are free from political pressure. At
the same time they are more faithful in the exercise of judicial self restraint
and arrogance of office has disappeared.
Combining Best Features
We adopted the plan as a Constitutional amendment at the General
Election in 1940.
Since it follows the method of selection and tenure set forth in your
proposed concurrent resolution, I will deal with it briefly. Judges are nominated by commissions consisting of laymen and lawyers. The names of three
qualified candidates for each judgeship are submitted to the Governor. He
selects one of them. The new judge serves for one year, then goes on the
ballot at the next election. The people have had a chance to see him in
action, to know him, to judge his record. They go to the polls and simply
answer one question: Shall Judge Blackstone of the District Court be retained in office? Yes or No?
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Thus, the wisdom of a nominating commission, the responsibility of a
governor and the will of the people are combined to provide a competent
judiciary.
The plan combines the best features of both the appointive and elective
systems, and adds new safeguards which assure a more competent judiciary.
The choice of the nominees is made by a group of persons which has
no other function, and whose only interest would be to name the best qualified men available. A nominating commission is representative of both the
bar and the people.
A governor will be careful in choosing his appointee. from the three
selected since his choice must later be confirmed by the people.
Then the necessity of approval by the entire electorate of the appointee's
record tends to insure faithful service on the bench. If a judge decides to
make a career of the bench, the requirement of confirmation of his record
from term to term, on a nonpartisan basis, likewise insures faithful service
throughout his career.
Under the plan a judge already in office when it was adopted needed
only to signify his intention to run for reelection in order to have his name
placed on the ballot. In such a case there was no need for any action by a
nominating commission.
Political Activity Banned
The Missouri Constitutional provision and the Colorado plan prohibit
political activity on the part of the judge.
No judge may directly or indirectly make any contribution to any political
party or organization.
No judge may hold any office in any political party or organization.
No judge may take part in any political campaign.
Every judge under the plan whole-heartedly approves of this restriction.
They welcome its protection, they loyally observe its terms. We find the
office of judge is a full-time job. The people approve this restriction. Apparently they do not want the judges holding office in political parties, and
devoting themselves to partisan purposes.
No candidate has refused consideration because of this restriction. Justice Holmes once said of a similar situation while everyone has a right to
engage in politics, not every one has the natural right to be a judge. We find
it has been very helpful in keeping political pressure off the court, and in
keeping judges out of politics.
In our state, national issues have played the main part in most elections.
We found under the old system the election of judges followed the national
political trends. This was the case both in electing judges who had to run
state-wide and those elected by the large cities only.
Under the party primary and election system, election of judges has
depended on the national issues and not upon a judge's ability, qualifications
or record. In the 20-year period between the first and second World Wars,
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only twice was a judge of the Supreme Court, who had served a full term,
reelected to another term. The ten elections during this period all turned on
national party issues, and the records and qualifications of judicial candidates
received but little, if any, attention.
A former judge of our court describes his fortunes at the polls this way:
"I was elected in 1916 because Woodrow Wilson kept us out of war. I was
defeated in 1920 because Woodrow Wilson did not keep us out of war. In
both of the elections not more than five percent of the voters knew I was on
the ticket." Such is not the case today under the plan.
High Quality of Nominating Commissions
The heart of the plan is the nominating commission. "I don't care," said
Boss Tweed, "who does the electing just so I do the nominating." Our nominating commissions have the confidence and respect of the people, the press,
and the bar.
Since the inception of the plan only outstanding lawyers have been
elected to serve on the nominating commission, and only laymen of the
highest character and standing have been appointed.
Not a single nomination by any commission has every been criticized by
the bar or the press, although thirty-three nominations have been made to fill
eleven vacancies; five on the appellate courts, and six on the trial courts.
In every instance, all the nominees have been widely appro, .d. Choosing
lawyers of character, ability, learning and industry has been the rule.
No commission has ever been charged with playing partisan politics
although lay members have been appointed first by a Democratic Governor,next by a Republican, and then by a Democrat. Every set of nominations
has represented both major political parties, regardless of the political complextion of the commission. In no instance has a commission stacked the
list of nominees against the Governor by naming only those of the opposite
political faith.
Recently, there were nominated for a vacancy on the trial bench in
Kansas City a Republican and two Democrats, all lawyers- of great ability
and high integrity. The two Democrats had actively supported an opponent
of the Governor in his primary campaign. But the Democrat who had been
the more active in his opposition was selected by the Governor. The Kansas
City Times observed editorially:
"The nonpartisan court plan's procedure has scored again . . . If
Governor Donnelly had appointed either of the other two candidates
he would have made a good selection . . . We congratulate the new
judge, the.commission that made the nomination, Governor Donnelly and
the State that is making a fine national reputation by nonpolitical courts."
The nominees for the appellate courts have been representative of the
entire state in the case of the -Supreme Court, and of the entire district for
a court of appeals..
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Any one who wishes is free to become a candidate for nomination by a
commission. Wide publicity is given to a vacancy, and to the deadline for
submitting names of candidates. The commission, on its own initiative, may
seek out candidates; a lawyer desiring the office may submit his own name,
or have someone do it for him. This is done merely by letter to the Chairman.
When a name is received, a simple questionnaire is submitted to the
candidate in order to ascertain if the candidate has the qualifications required
by law for the office, and to give to the lay members, especially, personal
and professional information about the candiate. Letters of recommendation
are welcomed. After a sufficient period has elapsed for the names of all those
wishing to be candidates to be submitted, and for investigation and study
by the commission, the members meet and choose the three nominees to be
submitted to the Governor.
The lay members have always been faithful and conscientious in informing themselves about the candidates. They consult with lawyer friends and
business acquaintances who know the candidates. They make personal investigations, and reach their own independent appraisal of each candidate.
No partisan political pressure has succeeded in forcing the nomination of
any person. It may have been attempted; if so it has been rebuffed. Judges
have been named for promotion, and qualified practitioners have been placed
on the appellate bench.
So long as the nominating commissions continue to name qualified, able
and conscientious nominees, as they have done in the past there can be no
bad appointment regardless of the person who may occupy the Governor's
chair.

Proof of the Pudding
Of course the plan has its enemies.
One objection has been that the plan is not truly nonpartisan because
each governor so far has followed party lines in choosing his appointee from
the three nominees.
Answering this, the St. Louis Post Dispatch, while urging a governor
sometime to cross the party line, stated:
"What is important is not so much that the Governor appoints without considering party affiliations, but that he be confronted, in every
instance, with a field of three good choices, as nominated by the official
bar commission. This is where the nonpartisan court plan does its first
good work. It gets a higher level of prospective judgeship material up
for consideration than was produced in the slating of candidates by selfserving political bosses. Its next good work is in retaining judges on the
bench so long as their records meet with the approval of the voter&"
Even though there may have been partisanship in the apointments. it
is of real and special significance that partisan politics has not entered in
the general elections where judges have been retained, or not retained in office.
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In 1942 the state went Republican but two qualified Supreme Court
judges, both Democrats, ran for reelection and were retained in office. The
City of St. Louis, which also went Republican, reelected 6 Democratic circuit judges and retained a Republican circuit judge previously named by the
Governor. Jackson County (Kansas City) went Democratic, but the voters
there removed one circuit judge, a Democrat, and retained one, also a Democrat, who had made an outstanding record on the bench.
In 1944, the Democrats were successful, and 14 judicial candidates, 4
Republican and 10 Democratic, all approved by polls taken by the bar associations, were retained in office. Then in 1946 St. Louis went Republican
but retained 10 Democratic judges in office.
Thus, it should be apparent that partisan political considerations have
been effectively removed from voting on the members of the judiciary.
At the last general election (1948) the State went Democratic, as did
Kansas City and St. Louis. Yet of the two judges reelected in Kansas City
one was a Republican; and of the seven judges reelected in St. Louis also,
one was a Republican.
In 1944, Judge Laurance M. Hyde of the Supreme Court and I both
ran for reelection. He is a well-known Republican. His brother was a Republican Governor and later a member of President Hoover's Cabinet. I am
a Democrat. In that election the state went Democratic. Yet, Judge Hyde,
long and prominently known as a Republican, polled about the same vote I
did in our overwhelmingly Democratic counties known as Missouri's "Little
Dixie", and I ran about even with Judge Hyde in the solidly Republican
counties.

Other Objections Answered
It is charged that the plan has tended to freeze in office all judges, good,
bad and indifferent, who were on the bench when the plan was adopted. It
does do this. A judge runs against no political opponent, either of an opposing or of his own party; he is not of course subject to a prima ry election.
He runs only on his record of service on the bench. Unless that record is
corrupt or obviously inefficient, there is every reason to expect he would
receive a favorable vote. But unless an incumbent has proved unworthy or
incapable, he should be retained under the spirit and purpose of the plan.
On the other hand, an unwanted incumbent can be turned out. A trial
judge of Jackson County was opposed by the bar and was not retained when
he ran for reelection.
The plan has been criticized as undemocratic.. I do not believe this
charge is well founded.
The charge arises from the fact that in Missouri the people do not nominate judges at a primary election. However, when our government was
formed, and for many years after, we followed the custom in this country
of appointing all the judges. We still do with the Federal judiciary.
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The plan does delegate to a representative group the duty of choosing
the nominees; and to the Governor the selection of the one, but reserves to
the people themselves the right of election. Every aspirant for judicial office
is still free to submit his candidacy for consideration by a nominating
commission.
In the past, choosing judicial nominees has been delegated to political
party conventions as representative of only a part of the people, but that
was not then believed to be undemocratic. Later, however, even party responsibility was removed in Missouri by substituting the direct primary for
party conventions for all offices, including judicial ones. In Colorado, I understand, you designate at party assemblies and nominate at the later primary.
It is true that in a democracy political office-holders, and through them
the policies and political principles which they avow, must give periodic
accounting to the voters. Their submission to "the will of the people" means,
in practice, that they and their policies must be judged at regular intervals by
a secret ballot, on which the voters are free to oppose them, and to turn to
new and different policies.
But what political policy or principle can a judge properly entertain
about the administration of his office? It is immediately obvious there can be
none whatever. No one would contend a judge should represent only his own
party on the bench. In fact, a judge represents no one; he serves everyone.
The only principle a judge can advocate is fair, impartial and sure justice
to all. And this must be so, be he a Republican or a Democrat, or a Liberal
or a Conservative Democrat. A judge's record becomes his only platform, and
upon it he is retained by the voters, or turned out by the voters.
A Democratic Plan Which the People Approve
I do not believe the charge that the plan is undemocratic has been sustained; to the contrary, the opposite seems true. A judge's record is submitted to and passed upon by the voters, unconfused with purely partisan
political issues.
A plan which tends toward independent judges as this one does, surely
not only follows the fundamental principles of democracy, but preserves
democracy itself.
There can be no doubt but that the people of Missouri approve the plan.
Never has a Constitutional change been better tested. The people expressed
their approval of it at the polls not once but three times, and each time by a
greater vote.
The plan was adopted in 1940 as a Constitutional amendment by the
vote of the people. The plurality favoring it was 90,000. Two years later
the people voted to hold on to the plan. The plurality was doubled in that
election to 180,000.
The following year plans were made for a Constitutional Convention.
Delegates were elected by local party committees. Delegates-at-large were
agreed upon by State Republican and Democratic Committees acting together.

DICTA
The Delegates included ward political committeemen, and more prominent political leaders as well as educators, lawyers, labor leaders and businessmen. After a debate the Convention not only adopted the plan without
changing a word, but even put two more courts under it. These two were
the Courts of Criminal Correction in St. Louis which handle misdemeanor
cases and appeals from the police courts. These courts had long been used
for political advantage. Not only was the application of the plan extended,
but the Convention by the new Constitution placed more power and responsibility in the Supreme Court than that possessed by the Supreme Court of
any other state at that time.
The popularity of the plan had much to do with the overwhelming approval of the new Constitution. It was adopted by a large vote at a special
election in February, 1945 despite the upset conditions of the war. At
that time the plan had had four full years of operation. For the third time
the people spoke in its favor.
Lawyers Now Approve
When the plan was first proposed most of the lawyers were either indifferent to the plan because they assumed it had no chance of being adopted,
or opposed it. The bar of rural Missouri was almost unanimous in its opposition. But now the great majority of the lawyers of the entire state enthusiastically favor it.
An unanticipated result of the plan has been the much closer relationship between the bench and the bar. The judges are now more familiar
and are more concerned with the lawyers' problems in administering the
courts than ever before.
Our state bar has properly undertaken the duty of informing the people
about the judges, and advising whether or not they deserve a favorable vote
for retention in office.
In advance of an election the state bar polls the lawyers as to whether
a candidate for reelection should be retained. This is a statewide referendum
of lawyers on the Supreme Court judges, or district wide on others. If the
vote is favorable the bar then undertakes the campaign for retaining the
judge in office.
The bar is managed by a board of governors. The majority of the board
are lawyers from the rural sections. Yet at the last election the board voted
to expend funds for advertisements in rural newspapers, where education on
the plan was needed, urging the voters to vote the judicial ballot and to
retain in office the judges which had been previously approved by the lawyers.
The judges take an active part in the work of the bar. They attend the
meetings. As I say, they are much closer to all the lawyers than they ever
were before.
Under the new Constitution we have attempted to improve our old
justice of the peace courts in making them more efficient and more useful to
the people. We replaced them with a new system of Magistrate Courts.
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. The administration of the new system fell down in St. Louis. The bar
association there appointed a committee of lawyers to look into the matter.
One of the recommendations made by the lawyers was that these Magistrate Courts in St. Louis should be placed under the court plan. This
recommendation was adopted by the association.
The St. Louis Globe Democrat urged editorially:
"The remedy is to extend the nonpartisan court plan to include
the Magistrate Courts.
"The Bar Association will render a worthwhile service to the community if it accepts the responsibility of urging this reform upon the
Legislature."
Judges Are for the Plan
The judges, both those now under the plan, and those not under it,
are universally in favor of it.
Some one has said that a politician may ordinarily make a good judge
if he can stop being a politician when he goes on the bench, but the usual
system for election requires a judge to continue to be a politician in order to
remain a judge. Under the plan a judge need not be a politician, in fact he
must refrain from politics.
When Judge Hyde and I were reelected under the plan in 1944, we
spent our time at our desks doing our normal work instead of campaigning
throughout the state for months, first for nomination at the primary, and
then for election at the General Election. We were forbidden to make any
political contributions.
Of real importance is the fact a judge may devote his full time to his
official duties. These have increased in the highest courts, at least, because of
the many added responsibilities such as formulating rules of procedure, and
administering the state's judicial system.
I might observe it was only after the plan had been in operation for
several years that our Supreme Court for the first time in decades became
absolutely current with its docket, and has since remained so.
A judge may now devote his energies to becoming a better judge and to
improving the administration of justice and to improving the judicial system.
The trial judges throughout Missouri who are not included in the plan
are hopeful it will be extended to them. Your Colorado plan includes all
Supreme, District and some County Judges.

The Plan Has Produced Good Judges
The plan has grown in approval because it has produced good judges.
Lawyers with successful practices but no political bent have been induced to give up the practice and come to the bench. A statewide campaign
over a state even as large as Missouri, for office on the Supreme Court, has
seldom proved to be an attraction to the successful, learned, studious prac-
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titioner, but by the present plan men of such type are being added to that
court.
Only recently the Kansas City Star, speaking editorially of the plan, said:
"It has not succeeded in removing all unqualified persons from the
bench. But those who have reached the bench through the nonpartisan
court system have proved to be good judges. On the average those who
held over from the political era have been better judges. No longer does
the shadow of the political boss fall across the bench."
So we find the people like the plan, the press approves it, the lawyers
are for it, and the judges like it.

Labor Injunctions Under The Colorado Labor
Peace Act
By PHILIP HORNBEIN, JR.
of The Denver Bar

The labor injunction plays an important part in the scheme evolved by
the thirty-fourth General Assembly for the control and regulation of labor
unions known as the Colorado Labor Peace Act.1 The Act itself is an
omnibus piece of legislation designed to exercise a far-reaching control over
all phases of labor union activity. Briefly, the over-all objectives of the Act
may be summarized as follows:
1. To confine labor disputes to the employees of a single employer.
2. To control
the internal affairs of labor unions and prohibit their
2
political activity.
3. To restrict the processes of collective bargaining with reference to
certain types of contracts.
4. To limit the use of strikes, boycotts, and picketing and to prohibit
their use completely in some cases.
5. To restore the power to courts of equity to issue labor injunctions.
This article is confined to a discussion of the use of injunctions under
the Act. Prior to the passage of the Act in 1943, Colorado had what properly could be called a "little Norris-LaGuardia Act" s which limited the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes to cases involving physical injury to
person or property with which the law enforcement authorities were unable
to cope. The term "labor dispute" was defined broadly enough to include
organizational disputes-that is, attempts by, a union to organize the workers
4
of a non-union plant.
'Chap. 131, 1943 Session Laws of Colorado.
'This feature of the Act was declared unconstitutional by the Colorado Supreme
Court in American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P. (2d) 145, 160

A.LR. 873.

: Chap. 59, 1933 Session Laws of Colorado.
'Ibid. Sec. 12; Denver Local Union v. Perry Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 25, 101 P(2)
436, Denver Local Union v. Buckingham, 108 Colo. 419, 118 P(2) 1088.
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Narrowing the Definition of Labor Dispute
Under the 1943 Act many of the provisions limiting the jurisdiction of
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes are retained, but the definition
of a labor dispute is drastically altered. Only where there is a "controversy
between an employer and such of his employees as are organized in a collective bargaining unit" does a labor dispute exist within the meaning of
the Act. 5 The "collective bargaining unit" referred to is a union selected
by a majority of the employees in an election conducted by the Industrial
Commission. 6
It is this narrow definition of a labor dispute that opens wide the doors
of courts of equity to plaintiffs seeking injunctions against labor unions.
Underlying this definition was the belief on the part of the legislators that
the scale of wages paid by one employer has no effect upon, and is therefore
no concern of, the workers in other plants in the same industry.
Unfortunately, this theory of economic isolation does not jibe with the
basic facts of industrial life. Many years before the passage of the Wagner
Act, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taft,
stated: "Labor unions . . . were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer . . . Union
was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their
employer . . . To render this combination at all effective employees utste
make their combination extend beyond one shop. It is helpful to have as
many as may be in the same trade in the same community united, because in
the competition between employers they are bound to be affected by the
standard of wages of their trade in the neighborhood.1' 7 (Italics added). This
But the General Assembly was of the opinion that while under certain
circumstances it might be proper for employees to combine to secure better
wages and working conditions from their own employer, they should not be
permitted to engage in any activity aimed at improving the lot of their fellow workers in the plant across the street. Accordingly, courts were given
full power to grant injunctions in any case not within the narrow confines
of a statutory labor dispute, and it was expressly provided that "nothing herein
shall prevent the pursuit of equitable or legal relief in courts of competent jurisdiction, nor shall it be any ground for refusal of such relief that all of the
administrative remedies provided in this Act before the Commission shall not
have been exhausted." 9
'Sec. 2(7).
'Sec. 2(6).

American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209; 42 S. Ct. 72,
78; 66 L.Ed. 189; 27 ALR 360.
same basic fact was again recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Assn.s
' 301 U. S. 468; 57 S.Ct. 857; 81 L.Ed. 1229.
'Sec. 8(1).
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The Substantive Basis
Having given the green light to the courts to issue injunctions in labor
disputes, the General Assembly next turned to the task of providing the
substantive provisions to serve as a basis for equitable relief. These are
found in Sec. 6(2) (g), which makes it an unfair labor practice on the part
of an employee acting individually or in concert with others "to engage in
a secondary boycott, or to hinder or prevent, by threats, intimidation, force,
coercion, or sabotage, the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, equipment
or services, or to combine or conspire to hinder or prevent, by any means,
whatsoever, the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, equipment or services." (Italics added.)
In view of the criminal penalties provided for the violation of any provision of the Act,10 there would appear to be grave doubt as to constitutionality of Sec. 6(2) (g) because of its generality, if for no other reason.' The
section is a catch-all provision which could be construed to prohibit just about
any type of customary union activity. The italicized words, given their
literal meaning, would ban all strikes, boycotts, and picketing in any form and
under any circumstances, since the object of such activity is usually to hinder
or prevent the employer from obtaining, using or disposing of materials or
services. In the case of a strike, the purpose is to deprive the employer of
the services of his employees. A boycott is designed to prevent the employer
from disposing of his products through sales to the public. A picket may be
for the purpose of implementing either a strike or boycott. So under Sec.
6(2) (g) all of these forms of customary union activity are proscribed even
where there is a labor dispute as defined by the Act. Few would contend
for the literal enforcement of this provision. Such application, assuming its
constitutionality, would deprive workers of the only means by which they
can improve their working conditions. It had been hoped that this section
would receive judicial clarification by the Colorado Supreme Court when the
occasion arose so that unions, employers, and lawyers would have some idea
as to what acts were included within the scope of Sec. 6(2) (g). Although
the issue has been presented to the Court on four different occasions, there is
still no indication as to the proper interpretation of this section.
Supreme Court Fails to Clarify
In the case of American Federationof Labor v. Reilly, 12 the Court, after
invalidating the provisions of the Act requiring the incorporation of labor
unions, held that the question of the constitutionality of other sections of the
Act was not ripe for decision.
1

Sec. 23.
nCline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; 47 S.Ct. 681; 71 L.Ed. 1146.
Supra, note 2.
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The later case of Denver Milk Producers v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Is was a consolidation of five separate actions for injunctions. Four
of the cases were concerned with the efforts of the teamsters' union to organize
the employees of motor carriers transporting milk into Denver. To accomplish
this, the members of the union who were employed by the Denver dairies
refused to unload the milk transported by non-union drivers. The fifth case
was concerned with the attempt of the union to organize the employees of
Beach, a Denver dairy. The union engaged in a peaceful picket at the Beach
plant and threatened to place pickets in front of certain retail grocery stores
which sold Beach products. As a result of the picket at the Beach plant some
bricklayers who were engaged in construction work for Beach left their work.
A temporary restraining order had been issued in the Beach case. The five
cases were consolidated for trial. The District Court found "that the objectives
4
of the defendants and the means used to secure those objectives were lawful"'
Supreme Court.)

and granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed the trial court and remanded the case with "instructions to reinstate
the restraining order and make the same permanent, and for further proceedings with respect to damages and otherwise as may be necessary, such
proceedings to be in harmony with the views herein expressed." 15
The Court did not set aside the finding of the lower court that the acts
of the defendants were lawful, nor did it remand the case to the lower court
for further findings. The District Court was ordered to reinstate and make
permanent the temporary restraining order although the defendants had never
had an opportunity to file an answer and there had been no trial of the case
on the question of a permanent injunction. At no place in the Court's opinion is it pointed out what conduct on the part of the defendants warranted
injunctive relief, nor to what acts of defendants the injunction should extend.' 8 The Court's opinion affords no means for distinguishing between
permissible and prohibited activity in labor disputes. There is no attempt to
distinguish between the acts of defendants which were of a primary nature
directed against the employer as against those of a secondary nature designed
for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear upon third parties to cause them
to cease doing business with the employer.
Decision Overlooks Matn Point
The seeming effect of the Court's decision is to make illegal all labor
union activity in the absence of a statutory labor dispute. Two dissenting
justices, Stone and Hilliard, thought that the injunction should be confined
"1 16 Colo. 389, 183 P. (2) 529.
'" Folio 1842 of the original record.
(This does not appear from the decision of the
Supra, p. 425.
'The Court did order that the temporary restraining order be made permanent, but
it was only in the Beach case that a temporary restraining order was issued, and its terms
were inapplicable to the facts of the other four cases.
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to such acts as constituted a secondary boycott. 17 The majority opinion did
not indicate whether the injunction was ordered because defendants had
committed an unfair labor practice under Sec. 6(2), or because the acts of
defendants ran counter to some other statute or the common law, or for just
what reason the injunction was being issued.
The Court's decision was based solely upon its finding that no labor.
dispute existed under the terms of the Act, and that therefore the District
Court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction.
But the point that eluded the grasp of the Court was whether or not
the trial court, having jurisdiction to issue the injunction, abused its discretion in refusing the relief prayed for. There was no holding by the Supreme
Court that the lower court erred in finding that the acts of defendants were
lawful. If this finding was supported by the evidence-and the Supreme
Court did not hold otherwise-then it is difficult to see on what basis an
injunction could be issued. Once having decided that no labor dispute existed,
the Court jumped to the conclusion that an injunction must necessarily issue,
without deciding (1) what acts of defendants were to be enjoined, or (2)
whether such acts were protected by constitutional guaranties. Rather, the
Court was content to quote at great length from an opinion of the Supreme
Court of Washington.' 8 But the Washington court recognized that peaceful
picketing is an exercise of the constitutional right of free speech. It held that
"when picketing ceases to be used for the purpose of persuasion-just the
minute it steps over the line from persuasion to coercion-it loses the protection of the Constitutional guaranty of free speech. * * *"19 As has already
been pointed out, there was no finding by either the trial court or the Supreme
Court that defendants were guilty of acts of coercion or any other wrongful
conduct.
The dissenting justices gave an illuminating opinion construing the antipicketing sections of the Act. 20 They held that none of the acts of defendant
was wrongful except the the threat to picket the retail stores selling Beach products. As to this, it was pointed out that the retail grocery stores were not in
the milk industry and were "strangers to the issue," and that the picketing
of these stores would be an attempt to "conscript neutrals." 21 It was the
opinion of Justices Stone and Hilliard that the picketing of the dairies did
not constitute any violation of the Act. They relied on the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritters
Cafe, 22 which held that a state could restrict "picketing to the area of the
"Supra. p. 431.
'Swenson

v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. (2)

193, 177 P. (2d) 873.

"Id., 177 P (2), at p. 880, quoted at p. 424 of 116 Colo., 183 P. (2) at p. 545.
"It should be noted, however, that the particular section referred to in the dissenting opinion, Sec. 6(2) (e), had already been declared inoperative by the Court in
American Federationof Labor v. Reilly, supra.
nSupra, p. 431.
"315 U. S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1143.
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industry within which a labor dispute arises." 23 The Ritter case recognized
that peaceful picketing was an exercise of the constitutional right of free
speech, but held that the states were not without power to delineate an area
in which picketing was prohibited. Specifically, it held that it was within the
power of the State of Texas to forbid the "disputants in a particular industrial
episode to conscript neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or the
industry in which it arose. We hold that the Constitution
does not forbid
24
Texas to draw the line which has been drawn here."1
The distinction between the Ritter case and the Milk Producers case is
that the Colorado court makes no attempt to draw a line between permissible
and forbidden picketing.
Ili the later case of Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Green,25 the Colorado
Court followed its decision in the Milk Producers case, holding that since
there was no labor dispute as defined by the Act, a temporary injunction restraining defendants from picketing was properly issued. As in the Milk
Producers case, the Court did not consider whether the picketing under the
circumstances was an exercise of the constitutional right of free speech. In
neither the Milk Producerscase nor the Meat Cutters case did the Court make
any reference to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court holding
that a state court may not enjoin peaceful picketing simply because there is
no labor dispute as defined by state law. 26 . Nor did the Court undertake to
U. S. Supreme Court Rulings
In three decisions of the United States Supreme Court it has been firmly
established that a state may not prohibit peaceful picketing by means of a
narrow statutory definition of a labor dispute. The case of American Federation of Labor v. Swing 28 involved an unsuccessful attempt by the defendant
union to organize the employees of a beauty parlor. Both the proprietor and
his employees brought suit in an Illinois state court to enjoin the peaceful
picket being carried on by the union in front of the shop. The United States
Supreme Court, reversing the Supreme Court of Illinois, held that the picket
distinguish or overrule its own previous decisions which had held peaceful
27
picketing to be an exercise of the constitutional right of free speeech.
was constitutionally protected even though there was no dispute between the
proprietor and his employees. "A state cannot exclude working men from
peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle
"Id., p. 728 of 315 U. S.

'AId.
Reported in the Colorado Bar Association advance sheet for December 6, 1948.
Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321; 61 S. Ct. 568; 85 L.Ed.
855; Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769; 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178;
Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126, 88 L.Ed. 58.
"People v. Harris, 104 Colo. 386, 91 P. (2) 989, 122 ALR 1034; Denver Local
Union v. Perry Truck Lines, supra.

"American

' Supra, note 26.
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of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those .directly employed .by him. The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace. * * * The right of free communication cannot therefore
be mutilated by denying it to workers,
in a dispute with an employer, even
29
though they are not in his employ."
The same conclusion was reached in Bakery and Pastry Drivers v.
Wohl.30 There the defendant union was seeking to compel certain bakery
peddlers to hire relief help. The union picketed the wholesale bakery where the
peddlers purchased their goods and threatened to picket retail dealers to whom
they made deliveries. The New York Court of Appeals had held that an
injunction should issue because the dispute with not within the statutory
definition of a labor dispute. The United States Supreme Court held to the
contrary, stating that "One need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by state
law to have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to express a grievance
in a labor matter by publication unattended
by violence, coercion, or conduct
3
otherwise unlawful or oppressive.,
The New York Court of Appeals was again reversed in the case of
Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos 32 because it had assumed "that if a
controversy does not come within the scope of state legislation limiting the
issue of injunctions, efforts to make known 33one side of an industrial controversy by peaceful means may be enjoined."
Wide Scope of Colorado Injunctions

Although these decisions of the Supreme Court were all prior to the
decisions of the Colorado court in the Milk Producersand Meat Cutters cases,
they are referred to in neither decision. In both cases the Colorado Supreme
Court assumed "that if a controversy does not come within the scope of state
legislation limiting the issue of injunctions, efforts to make known one side of
an industrial controversy by peaceful means may be enjoined." 34 In both
cases the Colorado court was "concerned only with the question whether there
was involved a labor dispute within the meaning of the Colorado statutes and
assumed that the legality of the injunction followed from a determination that
such a dispute was not involved. " 35 In both cases the Colorado court "excluded working men from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and
"Id., p. 326 of 312 U. S., p. 570 of 61 S.Ct.
note 26.
Id.,p. 774 of 315 U. S., p. 818 of 62 S.Ct.
Supra, Note 26.
'Id., pp. 295, 296 of 320 U. S., p. 127 of 64 S.Ct.
'Supra,

Cf. Cafeteria Union v. Angelos, supra.
Cf. Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 774, 62 S.Ct. 816, 818.
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workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed
s
by him. " 86
In the late case of International Brdtherh~od v. Publix Cab Company s
the Court came to the conclusion that there was no dispute between the parties
and upheld an injunction of the trial court which restrained defendants from
striking or picketing. The case involved a strike by taxicab drivers and an
accompanying picket. The cab company sought an injunction. All this
would seem to be some evidence that there was a dispute of some nature, even
if it was not clear to the Court what it was about.
The decision appears to be the first in which any court has attempted to
decide for the workers whether or not they have a sufficient dispute with their
employer to warrant their leaving their jobs.
The Court recognized that peaceful picketing is a constitutional right,
but held that because of the "absence of negotiations" or a "statement of
grievances ... we say that it is against the public interest to allow such picketing..."

(Italics added.)

Act Repugnant to 14th Amendment
If the exercise of a constitutional right is subject to restraint whenever
the Court believes it to be contrary to the public interest, it is not a right
at all, but a privilege which may be enjoyed only at the pleasure of the Court.
Censorship is always invoked under the guise of "public necessity." Cf.
Schenck v. United States,8 in which the "clear and present danger" doctrine was enunciated by Justice Holmes.
There is little doubt that the Act as applied by the Colorado court
is clearly repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in the
Wohl, Swing and Angelos cases. The United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction in the Milk Producers case,39 but subsequently dismissed
the appeal "without prejudice to the determination in further proceedings of
any questions arising under the Federal Constitution. Cf. Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549."4"

Since a statutory labor dispute can exist in Colorado only where a
majority of the employees of a single employer have voted in favor of a
particular "collective bargaining unit," the effect of the Court's decisions is
"Cf. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 326, 61 S. Ct.
568, 570.
Reported in the Colorado Bar Association advance sheet for January 13, 1949.
"249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470.
"68 S. Ct. 158.
'334 U. S. 809, 68 S.Ct. 1015, 92 L.Ed. 984.
The reason for the dismissal of
the appeal may be gleaned from the language of the Court in the Rescue Army case,
wherein an appeal from the Supreme Court of California was dismissed. "For we do not
undertake to resolve the doubt which necessarily exists concerning the [California]
court's meaning," 331 U. S. 549, 583, 584; 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1427, 91 L.Ed. 1666.
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to deny to workers who happen to be in a minority the right to attempt to
improve their working conditions by peaceful concert of action. The United
States Supreme Court has said that "by peaceful picketing working men
communicate their grievances," 41 and it has also stated that "One's right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections." 42 In Colorado it would seem
that working men may exercise their constitutional rights only when they
are in the majority.
Taft-Hartley Not As Objectionable
Even under the Taft-Hartley law, it was not considered advisable to
permit private parties to seek injunctions for violations of that law, and this
43
power was confined to the National Labor Relations Board.
The evils of "government by injunction" were recognized in the report
of the joint congressional committee established by the Taft-Hartley law to
observe the effect of its provisions in actual operation. The committee stated:
"If the 'era of government by injunction is being revived in labor
disputes,' the committee would be among the first to do something about
it, for we are unanimous in not wanting to return to that period of our
history which preceded the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in
1932."44

The committee, after reviewing the injunction cases instituted by the
General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board, concluded: "The
record on injunctions sought and obtained completely refutes the statement
that the era of government by injunction has been revived in labor disputes.1 45
The practical effect of this provision is to reduce the Industrial Commission
The Colorado act, unlike Taft-Hartley, specifically provides that the
power vested in the Industrial Commission shall not "prevent the pursuit of
equitable or legal relief in courts of competent jurisdiction, nor shall it be
any ground for refusal of such relief that all of the administrative remedies
provided in this act before the Commission shall not have been exhausted." 46
to an inert status so far as the Labor Peace Act is concerned, since it is more
expeditious for a complainant to proceed directly in the district court rather
'Carpenters Union v. Ritters Cafe, supra, p. 727 of 315 U. S., p 810 of 62 S.Ct.
'West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638; 63 S.
C. 1178, 1185, 1186.
' House Conference Report 510, on H.R. 3020, page 57; Bakery Sales Drivers
Local v. Wagshal, 333 U. S. 437, 442; 68 S. Ct. 630, 632.
Report ofJoint Committee on Labor Management Relations. 80th Congress, 2d
Session, p. 22.
Id.. p. 28.

"Sec. 8(1).
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than file a complaint with the Commission which must first hold a hearing
before it can apply to the Court for an enforcement order.
"Labor Peace Act" Brings No Peace
The return of government by injunction to Colorado has not resulted
in labor peace. On the contrary, according to the records of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 47 the yearly average of work stoppages in Colorado rose
from 10.6 for the five-year period preceding 1943 to 25.77 for the period
between January 1, 1944 and July 1, 1948 (the last date for which figures
are available). The total number of men involved in work stoppages in
Colorado rose from an annual average of 3,328 for the five-year period
preceding 1943 to an annual average of 13,997 for the January 1, 1944July 1, 1948 period. The annual average of man-days idle increased from
30,734 to 261,644, for the same periods.
This increase in industrial strife cannot be written off as part of a
national trend, since during the five-year period preceding 1943, the men
involved in work stoppages in Colorado comprised less than .28 of 1% of
the national total, while for the period between January 1, 1944 and July 1,
1948, this figure rose to .44 of 1%. Similarly, the number of man-days idle
in Colorado was less than .2 of 1% of the national total for the years 1938
through 1942, while for the January 1, 1944-July 1, 1948 period it jumped
to .47 of 1 % of the national total.
Apparently industrial peace in Colorado will not be realized by means
of the labor injunction.

More Old Dicta Available
Supplementing the announcement last month concerning the availability
of old copies of Dicta, we now list the following issues as available upon
request. Those issues added since last month are italicized:
1939-March, May and June.
1940-June, August and September.
1941-February.
1943-June.
1944-February, April, July, August, September, October, November,
and December.
1946-March, May, June, September, October, and December.
1947-January, March, June, July, August, September, October, November, and December.
If your missing issues are not included in.the above listing, feel free,
nevertheless, to request them. We may be able to supply you, although the
above dates are the only ones for which there is any substantial number.
4 All figures for the year 1938 through 1947 are derived
from the Handbook of
Labor Statistics, 1947 edition, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics , the figures
for the first six months of 1948 are derived from the information contained in the
Bureau's release of November 3, 1948.
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Matters Before The Thirty-Seventh General
Assembly of Interest to Lawyers
By HUBERT D. HENRY
of The Denver Bar

This is not intended to be a comprehensive report or to cover all
matters before the present session of the General Assembly, but is intended
merely to give an interim report on some matters which are of general
interest to the bar.
At the time of writing this article, seventeen bills have been enacted
into law and the General Assembly is over its fiftieth day, which is generally
considered the halfway mark of a legislative session. These seventeen bills
include the Upper Colorado River Compact, The Arkansas River Compact,
the creation of the Colorado Council of UNESCO, the removal of the Racing
Commission from civil service, a bill relating to the sale of lands by the
State Land Board; a bill providing a method for paying the monthly salaries
of the members of the General Assembly, which monthly salaries were
created by the 1948 special session of the General Assembly; a bill exempting
towing, wrecking and repairing vehicles, hearses and ambulances from regulation by the P.U.C.; three appropriations to widows of deceased members,
an appropriation of $370,000 for the expenses of the General Assembly,
and six deficiency appropriations totaling $1,335,500. It will be seen from
this that most of the real legislating will be done in the second half of the
legislative period.
The bill to integrate the State Bar of Colorado has been introduced in
both houses (S. B. 288, H. B. 448) but has not been printed by the Judiciary
Committee of either house, and there is no noticeable movement on its behalf
in the assembly.
H. B. 957, by Representative Bennett of Denver, provides that in
any civil action wherein judgment for costs may be entered by the court
in favor of one of the parties and against another party, the court may include in such judgment for costs all or such part of the attorney fee which
such winning party is obligated to pay, which the court in its discretion
deems reasonable in order to do substantial justice between the parties. Such
allowance would be reviewable in the same manner as any other part of the
judgment.
Although this bill is designed primarily for the protection of litigants,
it is, of course, a matter of interest to every practicing lawyer. There are
two situations which the bill is aimed at principally: first, to clip the wings
of the litigious citizens who bring endless numbers of unjustified lawsuits,
and secondly, to discourage the practice on the part of many defendants of
refusing to recognize small claims, because of the expense of litigation which
is placed upon the plaintiff if the claim is denied. This bill has been printed
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and is in the Fees and Salaries Committee of the House. I am sure the
recommendations of the members of the bar to the members of the General
Assembly on this bill will be helpful.
The probation bill (H. B. 150, S. B. 227), in which the bar is very
much interested, has been printed by the House of Representatives, as has the
parole bill (H. B. 149, S. B. 228). These two bills are the subject of a
public hearing which will have been held before this article appears in print.
I am unable to state much about the position of the General Assembly on
these two bills, but I know of no particular opposition to either of them.
H. B. 152 and S. B. 305, providing and defining the powers and duties
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with reference to the Supreme
Court and other courts, and H. B. 154 (S. B. 308) to provide service benefits
and retirement for disability of judges, have been printed by the Judiciary
Committee and have been sent to the Rules Committee for placement on
the calendar. However, they have not yet been entered on the calendar
of the House.
H. B. 153 (S. B. 307) to establish a Judicial Council has been printed
by the Judiciary Committee. H. B. 782, another bill which defines the
superintending control of -the Supreme Court over inferior courts, is also
in the Judiciary Committee. H. B. 174 (S. B. 306) is the bill which strikes
the expiration date of the judges' salary increase granted by the special
session held in 1948. There is some question about the constitutionality of
this bill as drawn, as it merely strikes out the expiration dates of the present
law, whereas the constitution says that the provisions of an act shall not be
extended except by re-enactment at length.
The concurrent resolution placing the Colorado Bar Association's amefidment to the judiciary article on the ballot has been printed in the Senate.
An open hearing is scheduled to be held on this amendment and the various
bills relating to the judiciary before this article appears.
Constitutional revision is again receiving considerable attention. Amendments have been introduced in both houses, giving veterans additional tax
exemptions. There have been introduced in the House by Representative
James Radetsky of Denver and others constitutional amendments which would
eliminate the fifteen day limitation on introduction of bills, provide a four
year term for members of the General Assembly, provide for filling of vacancies in the General Assembly by the Governor, district the large counties for
legislative representation purposes, provide four year terms for state officers, require a short ballot, provide four year terms for county officers,
permit counties to adopt a charter and require the consolidation of all counties
into 37 counties. Representative Bezoff has introduced an amendment which
would remove 15 department heads from civil service.
Senator Bishop also has introduced an amendment providing- for four
year terms for state officials. Senator Harpel has introduced a resolution for
four year terms for representatives.
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Then, too, there are in the making constitutional amendments for eliminating some of the unnecessary red tape in the General Assembly, such as
reading bills at length on two different days. Amendments will be introduced permitting home rule cities to fix official salaries other than by charter
and permitting city councils and other legislative bodies of cities and towns
to submit amendments to the charter without the necessity of a petition.
Undoubtedly there also will be introduced an amendment which will require
annual sessions of the General Assembly, except that the session of the General Assembly meeting in even-numbered years may be limited to consideration of constitutional amendments, revenue raising measures, appropriations
and other subjects designated by the Governor. This follows the present
California plan and consideration is being given to it because of the great
number of deficiency appropriations appearing before this session of the
General Assembly. These will probably total between two and three million
dollars for the biennium, a situation which might be remedied by annual
sessions and annual appropriations.
Three house bills which would increase the number of district judges
by two in Denver, one in the Eighth District and one in the First District
have passed the House and are in committee in the Senate. There they are
meeting some resistance, because of the fact that the Senate has a Republican
majority and the additional judges will be appointed by a Democratic
Governor.
A number of bills sponsored by the Childrens' Code Committee have
been introduced. H. B. 389 by Representative Pellet which would repeal
the laws relating to the indenturing of children has passed the House. Other
bills relating to the method of adopting children and making other revisions
relating to adoptions and indenturing have been introduced in both the House
and the Senate. There have been some hearings on these bills, but it is not
feasible at this time to attempt to review all of the bills and their status.
H. B. No. 15, which would purportedly extend the small estates act to
real estate and increase the amount to $500, has been printed in the House
but has not had further action.
H. B. 825, which has been printed by the House, makes several amendments to the present probate laws. It would provide specifically that lapsed
legacies and devises would become part of the residue, except those made to
descendents. It further provides that in filing a claim, it is not necessary to
file any documents, but those in support of the claim must be exhibited upon
demand. Claims could be filed after six months under certain conditions,
particularly where the claim was known to exist but by inadvertence was
not filed within the six months period, and no harm was done to the estate.
Contest of a will would be limited to six months instead of one year after
probate. The specific performance sections of the probate law would be
extended to conservators, and the court would be able to require the verification of petitions in probate matters. Another bill introduced in the Senate

76
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(S. B. 213) would permit personal representatives to invest in the accounts, shares, etc. of saving and loan associations insured by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
Bills have been introduced providing that actions for negligence shall
survive to and against personal representatives. Also, bills have been introduced in both houses which would increase the maximum amount which could
be allowed for negligent death. One bill would increase the present $5,000
limit to $15,000. Another bill would provide that operators of emergency
vehicles would not be liable for civil damages for acts performed in the
operation of such emergency vehicles.
Attention should be given to the desirability of informing the public
on legislative matters as they proceed, rather than merely sending out copies
of enacted bills long after they have been signed by the Governor. Having
this in mind, this year I have been experimenting with a legislative bulletin
which I have sent weekly to a selected list, advising of the actions during
the week of the General Assembly. Members of the legislature and some
of the persons who have received this bulletin have commented favorably
upon it. I am hopeful that by the next session of the legislature, a satisfactory
method of supplying this information will be devised.
This experimental proposition is daily opening new possibilities. Although it is impossible for me on a voluntary basis to send this bulletin out
extensively, by the meeting of the next General Assembly those who do
receive it should be able to form some idea as to its desirability and the
best way of getting it out. One short-coming of the present system is that we
are not able to get it out often enough, and also that we are not able to give
sufficiently complete information about most of the. bills. It is hoped that
either the General Assembly, the bar association or private enterprise can
develop a more adequate method for the next session.
New Pueblo County Bar Association Officers
New officers of the Pueblo County Bar Association elected in February
are: Harry S. Petersen, president; Myers Bumgardner, vice-president; Leo
Altman, chairman of the public relations committee; and Warren Lattimer,
chairman of the legal institutes committee. Harold Rudolph was re-elected
Secretary-Treasurer.
Theodore L. Brooks, formerly a member of the firm of Bryant, Petrie
and Brooks at Montrose, and Phillip F. Icke, formerly with the legal depart
ment of the telephone company in Denver, have announced the formation
of a partnership for the general practice of law with offices in the K. P.
Building, Montrose.
The Commercial Law League of America publishes a schedule of recommended rates for commercial collections which can be obtained without charge
from the Executive Secretary at 111 West Monroe St., Chicago 3, Ill.

